Fraud

Cause of Action
The essential elements of fraud are:
 * 1) A false statement of fact;
 * 2) Known by the defendant to be false at the time it was made;
 * 3) Made for the purpose of inducing the plaintiff to act in reliance thereon;
 * 4) Action by the plaintiff in reliance on the correctness of the representation; and
 * 5) Resulting damage to the plaintiff.

Finney v. Frost, 228 So.2d 617; Abbate v. Nolan, 228 So.2d 433; Tonkovich v. South Florida Citrus Industries, Inc., 185 So.2d 710. ''Poliakoff v. Nat'l Emblem Ins. Co.'', 249 So.2d 477, 478-79 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971)

Affirmative Defense
Because of litigants' proclivity to loosely sling the term “fraud” into pleadings, the law requires that fraud be described with precision. Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.120(b) mandates that “the circumstances constituting fraud ... shall be stated with such particularity as the circumstances may permit.” This means that an affirmative defense or claim “must clearly and concisely set out the essential facts of the fraud, and not just legal conclusions.” Flemenbaum v. Flemenbaum, 636 So.2d 579, 580 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). Where a defense of fraud exists, “it is not so subtle a concept that it cannot be described with precision.” Id.

Thompson v. Bank of New York, 862 So.2d 768, 770 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)


 * Glass v. Craig, 83 Fla. 408, 91 So. 332, 335 (1922) (holding that “a mere statement of opinion, belief, or expectation, although untrue and resting upon no information, is not such a false representation as to constitute fraud”);
 * Reimsnyder v. Southtrust Bank, N.A., 846 So.2d 1264, 1266 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (determining that statements made by bank officer were either not demonstrably false or were mere opinion and thereby not actionable under a fraud claim);
 * Thor Bear, Inc. v. Crocker Mizner Park, Inc., 648 So.2d 168, 172 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) (finding that a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation is not actionable if premised on mere opinion and not material fact);
 * Baker v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 661 So.2d 128, 131 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (reasoning that for a claim of misrepresentation to be actionable, it must be of fact rather than opinion);
 * Wasser v. Sasoni, 652 So.2d 411, 412 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (finding that seller's statements that the building was “a very good building” requiring “normal type of maintenance,” and “an excellent deal,” were clearly statements of opinion and not fraudulent misrepresentations);
 * Carefree Vills. Inc. v. Keating Props., Inc., 489 So.2d 99, 102 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) (finding that a seller's statement that he thought the lifetime leases could be broken was nothing more than an opinion, upon which no action for misrepresentation could be grounded).